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Missouri v. Holland's Second Holding 
Carlos Manuel Vázquez  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court in Missouri v. Holland, speaking through Justice 
Holmes, famously held that Congress has the power to pass a law to imple-
ment a treaty even if the law would not fall within Congress‘ legislative pow-
er in the absence of the treaty.
1
  Essential to this holding were two distinct 
propositions.  The first proposition is that the treaty-makers have the constitu-
tional power to make treaties on matters falling outside Congress‘ enumerated 
powers.  The second is that, if the treaty-makers make such a treaty and the 
treaty is not self-executing, the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress 
the power to implement such a treaty through a statute even if, in the absence 
of the treaty, the statute would be beyond Congress‘s legislative power.  The 
Court in Missouri v. Holland focused on the first proposition.  It devoted only 
one sentence to the second proposition: ―If the treaty is valid there can be no 
dispute about the validity of the statute under Article I, § 8, as a necessary 
and proper means to execute the powers of the Government.‖
2
 
As David Golove has shown, controversy concerning the issue ad-
dressed in Missouri v. Holland has recurred throughout our history, both be-
fore and after that decision.
3
  Each time, however, the controversy has re-
volved around the power of the treaty-makers to make treaties on matters 
outside Congress‘ enumerated powers.  The proposition that Congress has the 
power to implement any obligations undertaken under valid treaties has not 
been seriously questioned – until recently.  In recent articles, critics of Mis-
souri v. Holland have suggested that it is the second, heretofore unquestioned 
aspect of Missouri v. Holland that should be rejected rather than the first.  
Professor Curtis Bradley would construe the Constitution to ―allow the     
treatymakers the ability to conclude treaties on any subject but . . . limit their 
ability to create supreme federal law to the scope of Congress‘s power to do 
  
  Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  I am grateful for 
comments received from Curtis Bradley, Martin Flaherty, David Golove, Vicki Jack-
son, Nicholas Rosenkranz, David Sloss, and Mark Tushnet.  I am also grateful for the 
research assistance of Mark Herman. 
 1. 252 U.S. 416, 430-33 (1920). 
 2. Id. at 432. 
 3. David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Founda-
tions of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1077 
& nn.1-3 (2000). 
File: Vazquez Created on:  12/31/2008 10:13:00 AM Last Printed: 1/5/2009 12:23:00 PM 
940 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73   
so.‖
4
  In other words, the treaty-makers would have the power to conclude 
treaties on matters beyond Congress‘ legislative powers, but such treaties 
could not be self-executing, and Congress would lack the power to execute 
them.  More recently, Professor Nicholas Q. Rosenkranz has argued, too, that 
the treaty-makers have the power to conclude treaties on matters beyond 
Congress‘ legislative powers and that Congress lacks the power to execute 
such treaties.
5
  Rosenkranz‘s proposed constitutional interpretation differs 
from Bradley‘s in that he would recognize the treaty-makers‘ power to make 
such treaties self-executing. 
It is easy to see why no one has ever regarded it as plausible to read the 
Constitution to authorize the making of treaties that require implementation 
but deny Congress the power to implement such treaties.  Such a regime 
would appear to contradict one of the Founders‘ key convictions – that the 
federal government must have the power to assure compliance with its inter-
national commitments.  Prominent among the reasons the Founders decided 
to abandon the Articles of Confederation and write a new Constitution were 
the failure of the States to comply with treaties during the period of the Ar-
ticles of Confederation and the absence of any mechanism in the central gov-
ernment for assuring compliance with such treaties.  The Founders feared the 
foreign relations problems that could be caused by treaty violations and, more 
affirmatively, they wanted to reap the economic benefits of a reputation for 
treaty compliance.
6
  Although I believe that they gave the President and Se-
nate the power to make treaties on matters beyond Article I,
7
 it seems clear 
that the Founders would not have granted the federal government the power 
to conclude such treaties without giving the federal government the power to 
implement them.  Better to have no treaty at all than a treaty likely to be vi-
olated.
8
  Leaving the implementation of treaty commitments to the States 
would have been anathema.   
  
 4. Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 98, 100 (2000) [hereinafter Bradley, Federalism II]; see also Curtis A. 
Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998) 
[hereinafter Bradley, Federalism I]. 
 5. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 1867, 1937-38 (2005). 
 6. See generally Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2154 (1999) [hereinafter Vázquez, Laughing]; Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The 
Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM J. INT‘L L. 695 (1995) [hereinafter 
Vázquez, Four Doctrines]; Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Reme-
dies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082 (1992) [hereinafter Vázquez, Treaty-
Based Rights]. 
 7. Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties and the Eleventh Amendment, 42 VA. J. 
INT‘L L. 713, 715 (2002) [hereinafter Vázquez, Eleventh Amendment]; Carlos Manuel 
Vázquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1317 (1999) 
[hereinafter Vázquez, Breard, Printz].  
 8. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 393 (Max Farrand, 
ed., rev. ed. 1966) (Gouverneur Morris was ―not solicitous to multiply [and] facilitate 
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Although their particular proposals are untenable, given the Founders‘ 
design, Professors Bradley and Rosenkranz are on the right track insofar as 
they identify the second of Justice Holmes‘ two propositions as the potential-
ly problematic one from a federalism perspective.  The scope of the actual 
federalism problem attributable to the holding of Missouri v. Holland, how-
ever, is far more limited than Professors Bradley and Rosenkranz suggest.  
Their concern that the Treaty Power will be misused to circumvent the limita-
tions the Constitution imposes on Congress‘s legislative power is overstated 
given that such a ruse could succeed only if two-thirds of the Senate went 
along with it.  Article II‘s supermajority requirement is a strong structural 
guarantee that treaties will be concluded only if they would truly advance the 
foreign relations goals of the nation.   
But one of the federalism concerns obliquely raised by Bradley and Ro-
senkranz is potentially legitimate.  Both note that a federalism problem arises 
when the treaty-makers conclude aspirational treaty provisions.
9
  Though 
neither develops the argument, a concern along the following lines appears 
well-founded: when the treaty-makers, in complete good faith, conclude a 
treaty containing aspirational provisions, the treaty can be expected to sail 
through the Senate because it does not appear to require much of anything 
from the United States.  Under Missouri v. Holland, such a treaty could sup-
port legislation designed to advance its purposes, even if such legislation 
would otherwise fall outside the legislative power.  Indeed, the vaguer the 
aspirations, the broader the potential legislative power it supports.  This   
federalism problem is not hypothetical; there already are numerous treaties in 
force containing aspirational provisions which, under a literal reading of Mis-
souri v. Holland, could support legislation on any conceivable aspect of hu-
man rights.   
This legitimate federalism problem, however, does not warrant a com-
plete rethinking of Treaty Power doctrine.  It just requires some tinkering 
around Missouri v. Holland‘s edges.  The solution I propose is far narrower 
than those proposed by Bradley and Rosenkranz, and unlike their proposed 
solutions, it is consistent with the Founder‘s design.  I argue that the power to 
implement treaties under the Necessary and Proper clause is the power to 
require compliance with treaty obligations.  Because aspirational treaty provi-
sions do not impose obligations in any meaningful sense of the term, the 
clause does not give Congress the power to implement such provisions.  If 
such provisions concern matters otherwise beyond Congress‘ legislative pow-
ers, the Constitution leaves their implementation to the States.  This approach 
is consistent with the Founders‘ design because the Constitution reflects the 
  
Treaties. . . . The more difficulty in making treaties, the more value will be set on 
them.‖). 
 9. Bradley, Federalism I, supra note 4, at 443; Bradley, Federalism II, supra 
note 4, at 110; Rosenkranz, supra note 5, at 1931, 1934. 
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Founders‘ fear of treaty violations by States, and only obligatory provisions 
can be violated.   
Part II of this article considers and rejects Professor Bradley‘s approach.  
Part III considers and rejects Professor Rosenkranz‘s approach.  Part IV sets 
forth the true federalism problem posed by the holding of Missouri v. Holland 
and advances my more tailored solution to this problem.   
II.  BRADLEY‘S APPROACH 
Professor Bradley devotes much of his article to critiquing what he calls 
the ―nationalist‖ position on the Treaty Power reflected in Missouri v. Hol-
land.  The nationalist position, as he describes it, holds that the Power of the 
President and Senate to make treaties is subject neither to ―subject-matter‖ 
limitations nor ―states-rights‖ limitations, and that the power to make con-
gressional-executive agreements and even sole executive agreements is also 
free of these constraints.
10
  By ―subject-matter‖ limitations, Bradley means 
such limitations as the requirement that treaties involve matters of ―inter-
national‖ concern or concern matters that are appropriate for international 
negotiation.
11
  By ―states-rights‖ limitations, Bradley means the limitation of 
the Treaty Power to matters falling within Congress‘ legislative powers under 
Article I, section 8, and subsequent amendments,
12
 as well as the prohibition 
against commandeering articulated in cases such as New York v. United 
States
13
 and Printz v. United States,
14
 and state sovereign immunity doctrines 
reflected in the Eleventh Amendment and decisions such as Alden v. Maine.
15
  
Bradley argues that the Founders envisioned that the Treaty Power would be 
constrained by either subject-matter limitations or state-rights limitations and 
that the nationalist view clashes with history because it would reject both 
types of limitations, leaving the Treaty Power entirely unconstrained.
16
   
Professor Bradley‘s approach is not a narrowly originalist one, howev-
er.
17
  In the end, he advocates the approach that he thinks is best suited to 
current realities.  He rejects subject-matter limitations as infeasible in today‘s 
world because, in light of globalization, the line between what is international 
and what is national is impossible to maintain.
18
  He also accepts that the 
  
 10. Bradley, Federalism I, supra note 4, 393-94, 398.   
 11. Id. at 396, 417-23. 
 12. Id. at 392-93.  
 13. 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Bradley, Federalism I, supra note 4, at 409. 
 14. 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Bradley, Federalism I, supra note 4, at 409 
 15. 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Bradley, Federalism I, supra note 4, at 458. 
 16. Bradley, Federalism I, supra note 4, at 391-95, 409-17. 
 17. Id. at 461. 
 18. Id. at 451-56  (―[T]he line between what is domestic and what is international 
is difficult to define, the scope of what can plausibly be labeled international has 
grown substantially in recent years, and courts as a result are unlikely to restrict the 
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treaty-makers should be permitted to conclude treaties even if they address 
matters falling beyond Congress‘ legislative powers or contemplate action 
that, if taken by the Federal Government, would run afoul of other Tenth and 
Eleventh Amendment limitations.
19
  He insists, however, that Congress lacks 
the power to implement such treaties.
20
  To the extent such treaties require 
legislation that would be beyond Congress‘ legislative power under Article I, 
the implementing legislation would have to be enacted by the States. 
In many respects, Professor Bradley‘s critique is well founded.  I agree 
that the case for exempting the Treaty Power from the anti-commandeering 
doctrine and state sovereign immunity doctrines is not strong.
21
  Also weak is 
the claim that the holding of Missouri v. Holland extends to congressional-
executive agreements and sole executive agreements.
22
  (Unlike Professor 
Bradley, however, I do not regard these unfounded claims as reasons for 
completely rethinking Treaty Power doctrine; I would just reject the un-
founded claims.)  Finally, I do not deny that the Treaty Power was thought by 
the Founders to be, and remains, limited to matters that are of inter-national 
concern or that are appropriate for international negotiation.  I agree with 
Bradley and others, however, that in today‘s world, this ―subject matter‖ has 
expanded considerably since the Founding and today embraces a state‘s pro-
tection of the human rights of its own citizens.  Thus, very few, if any, good 
faith treaties would run afoul of this limitation.  Like Bradley, I have difficul-
ty envisioning a court striking down a treaty on this ground.
23
 
The sole aspect of the Bradley-defined ―nationalist‖ position that I em-
brace is the idea that the power to make Article II treaties is not limited to 
matters that would fall within Congress‘ legislative power under Article I and 
subsequent amendments.
24
  On this point, the Court‘s holding in Missouri v. 
Holland is strongly supported by the Constitution‘s text and structure.  The 
  
treaty power much, if at all, based on this distinction.  If federalism is to be protected 
in the treaty context, another approach must be found.‖). 
 19. Id. at 422-33. 
 20. Id. at 456-61. 
 21. Vázquez, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 7, at 726-33; Vázquez, Breard, 
Printz, supra note 7. 
 22. Vázquez, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 7, at 725; Vázquez, Breard, 
Printz, supra note 7, at 1339 n.75. 
 23. Bradley, Federalism I, supra note 4, at 451-56. 
 24. I do not mean to suggest that Professor Bradley made up the position that he 
describes as the nationalist one.  He quotes broad statements from commentators – 
including one by me – to the effect that the Treaty Power is unconstrained by limita-
tions grounded in state sovereignty.  Bradley, Federalism II, supra note 4, at 102 n.21 
(quoting Vázquez, Breard, Printz, supra note 7, at 1343).  At least in my case, howev-
er, the quoted statement was broader than intended. Indeed, the whole point of the 
article in which that statement was made was that the Treaty Power may well be sub-
ject to the Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering doctrine.  Vázquez, Breard, Printz, 
supra note 7.  What I should have said is that the power to make treaties extends to 
matters beyond Congress‘ legislative power.   
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constitutional text affirmatively grants Congress enumerated legislative pow-
ers, such as the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce.
25
  By  
negative implication, it denies Congress the power to legislate on matters 
falling outside its enumerated powers.  Article II separately sets forth the 
power to make treaties and assigns that power to the President (with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate).
26
  Because the Treaty Power is delegated to 
the federal government, the Tenth Amendment‘s reservation of non-delegated 
powers to the States and the people has no bearing.  The relevant question 
concerns the scope of the Article II treaty-making power.  To be sure, be-
cause the Supremacy Clause declares that treaties are the ―supreme Law of 
the Land,‖ Articles II and VI together give the President (with the Senate‘s 
consent) a legislative power.  There is no textual basis, however, for confin-
ing the scope of this power to the matters over which Congress has legislative 
power under Article I.  To conclude that the Treaty Power is so limited would 
be like saying that the power to regulate the army and navy extends no further 
than the power to establish post offices.  The separately enumerated powers 
were plainly meant to serve different purposes; they thus incorporate different 
limits.   
The purpose of the power to make treaties is to obtain commitments 
from other countries beneficial to the nation as a whole.  An example of such 
a commitment, commonplace at the time of our Founding and throughout our 
history, is the commitment of another nation to respect certain rights of U.S. 
nationals present in its territory.  The typical price we pay for such a benefit is 
to undertake a reciprocal obligation with respect to nationals of our treaty 
partners.  There is no basis for believing that our Constitution disables the 
federal government from obtaining such benefits in areas that would other-
wise be the exclusive province of the States.  (Since the States are forbidden 
to enter into treaties,
27
 if the federal government lacked the power to obtain 
such benefits, the nation as a whole would lack the power.)  Indeed, from the 
beginning of our history, we have committed ourselves by treaty to respect 
rights of aliens on matters otherwise exclusively within state legislative pow-
er, and the validity of such treaties has never seriously been questioned.   
That the Founders themselves viewed such treaties to be valid is shown 
by the fact that there were treaties in force at the time of the Founding – con-
cluded during the period of the Articles of Confederation – that included pro-
visions on matters outside the Article I powers of Congress.  For example, a 
1786 treaty with Prussia protected Prussian citizens against state legislation 
denying freedom of conscience or religious worship, ―‗and when dying they 
were guaranteed the right of decent burial and undisturbed rest for their    
  
 25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
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bodies.‘‖
28
  The Founders declared this treaty and the others concluded before 
the Founding to be the ―supreme Law of the Land,‖
29
 thus strongly suggest-
ing that they viewed this particular provision to be within the treaty-making 
power.  Yet clearly this treaty concerned matters not delegated to Congress 
under Article I.  The matter would have been of purely local concern had not 
Prussia undertaken reciprocal obligations towards U.S. citizens. 
There is additional strong evidence that the Founders understood the 
Treaty Power to extend beyond Congress‘ legislative powers.  Professor 
Bradley himself, in rebutting the broad nationalist view, provides persuasive 
evidence that the Founders understood the Treaty Power to extend to all mat-
ters of international concern.
30
  By contrast, his evidence that the Founders 
considered the Treaty Power to be constructively limited to matters over 
which Congress had been given legislative power is flimsy.  The closest he 
comes to finding support for that position is a statement by George Nicholas 
during the Virginia ratification debates to the effect ―that no treaty could be 
made ‗which shall be repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution, or inconsis-
tent with the delegated powers.‘‖
31
 As discussed above, however, the Treaty 
Power is itself a delegated power; the question concerns its scope.  Any im-
plication in that statement that the Treaty Power extends no further than the 
legislative powers of Congress is overwhelmed by the contrary indications in 
the ratification debates in Virginia and elsewhere.
32
 
Bradley can point to a greater number of statements in our post-
ratification history that appear to support the view that the Treaty Power ex-
tends no further than the legislative power.  As David Golove has persuasive-
ly shown, however, most of these statements were made by politicians oppos-
ing particular treaties.
33
  As objective interpretations of the Constitution, these 
statements carry little weight.  More probative on this score are expressions 
of the contrary view by well-known supporters of states‘ rights, such as John 
C. Calhoun, who asserted that ―the treaty-making power has, indeed, been 
regarded to be so comprehensive as to embrace, with few exceptions, all 
questions that can possibl[y] arise between us and other nations, and which 
can only be adjusted by their mutual consent, whether the subject-matter be 
comprised among the delegated or the reserved powers.‖
34
   
  
 28. Vázquez, Breard, Printz, supra note 7, at 1341 n.78 (quoting ROBERT T. 
DEVLIN, THE TREATY POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 186 
n.92 (1908)).  
 29. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  The Supremacy Clause by its terms applies to 
treaties made before as well as those made after the entry into force of the Constitu-
tion.   
 30. Bradley, Federalism I, supra note 4, at 429-33. 
 31. Id. at 413 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 32. See generally Golove, supra note 3, at 1141 n.195. 
 33. Id. at 1270. 
 34. Id. at 1235 n.531 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In response to David 
Golove‘s reliance on Calhoun as supporting the nationalist view, Professor Bradley 
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It is also significant that the judiciary has consistently upheld and en-
forced treaty provisions addressing matters that Congress would have lacked 
the power to regulate directly under then-prevailing views of the scope of 
Congress‘ enumerated powers.  Numerous cases concerned the right of indi-
viduals to inherit or dispose of property within the States – a matter regarded 
at the time as outside the legislative power of Congress.  Treaties promising 
to respect such rights of aliens in exchange for our treaty partners‘ commit-
ment to respect similar rights of U.S. citizens have been upheld from the be-
ginning.
35
 
In any event, my purpose here is not to defend the holding of Missouri v. 
Holland that the power to make treaties extends to matters beyond the legisla-
tive power of Congress.  In the end, Professor Bradley accepts (albeit on non-
originalist grounds) that the treaty-makers should be permitted to make such 
treaties.
36
  My focus is Professor Bradley‘s argument that treaties validly 
made can have no effect as domestic law insofar as they address matters 
beyond Congress‘ legislative power, and that such treaties may not be imple-
mented by federal statutes that would exceed Congress‘ legislative power.  
This position is untenable in the light of key commitments of the Founders in 
adopting the Constitution.  Had the Founders shared Bradley‘s concerns, they 
would have addressed them by limiting the treaty-makers‘ power to make 
such treaties in the first place.  Professor Bradley‘s solution – to permit the 
treaty-makers to make the treaty but deny such treaties domestic effect and 
deny Congress the power to implement them
37
 – would have been anathema.   
Among the principal animating causes of the Framers' decision to estab-
lish a new government under a new Constitution, rather than simply amend 
the Articles of Confederation, was the inability of the central government 
under the Articles to ensure that the States complied with the nation's treaty 
obligations.  Edmund Randolph listed prominently among his reasons for 
proposing a new constitution the fact that the Confederation ―could not cause 
infractions of treaties or of the law of nations, to be punished.‖
38
  In assessing 
competing constitutional proposals, the first question James Madison asked 
was: 
Will it prevent those violations of the law of nations [and] of Trea-
ties which if not prevented must involve us in the calamities of  
  
points out that Calhoun insisted that the treaty power extended only to matters of 
international concern.  See Bradley, Federalism II, supra note 4, at 103-05.  I do not 
dispute that the Founders regarded this as a limitation.  
 35. See, e.g., Chirac v. Lessee of Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259 (1817); Ware v. 
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). 
 36. Bradley, Federalism I, supra note 4, at 422-33. 
 37. Bradley, Federalism I, supra note 4, at 456-61. 
 38. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 19 (Max Farrand 
ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter 1 RECORDS].  See generally Vázquez, Treaty-Based 
Rights, supra note 6, at 1102.   
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foreign wars?  The tendency of the States to these violations has 
been manifested in sundry instances.  The files of Congs. contain 
complaints already, from almost every nation with which treaties 
have been formed.  Hitherto indulgence has been shewn to us.  
This cannot be the permanent disposition of foreign nations.  A 
rupture with other powers is among the greatest of national calami-
ties.  It ought therefore to be effectually provided that no part of a 
nation shall have it in its power to bring them on the whole.  The 
existing confederacy does [not] sufficiently provide against this 
evil.
39
 
The Founders were concerned not just that treaty violations would risk 
destructive and costly retaliation by offended treaty partners,
40
 but also that 
such violations would deter other nations from concluding potentially benefi-
cial agreements with the new nation.
41
  There was no dissent from the view 
that treaty compliance could not be left to the States.  It was common ground 
among the Founders that the Constitution must give the federal government 
the power to secure compliance with treaties. 
To this end, the Founders designated ―all Treaties‖ as the ―supreme Law 
of the Land‖ and instructed the courts to give them effect.
42
  This represented 
  
 39. 1 RECORDS, supra note 38, at 316 (alteration in original).  
 40. See 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION 
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 119 (Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed. 1891) [hereinafter 
ELLIOTT'S DEBATES] (statement of William Davie) (―A due observance of treaties . . . 
is the only means of rendering less frequent those mutual hostilities which tend to 
depopulate and ruin contending nations.‖); id. at 279 (statement of Charles Cotes-
worth Pinckney) (―[T]reaties shall be considered law of the land; and happy will it be 
for America if they shall be always so considered: we shall then avoid the disputes, 
the tumults, the frequent wars, we must inevitably be engaged in, if we violate trea-
ties.‖); THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 42 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (―The just 
causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violations of treaties or from direct 
violence.‖). 
 41. See ELLIOTT'S DEBATES, supra note 40, at 266 (statement of Charles Cotes-
worth Pinckney) (―[If treaties had not been considered the law of the land] and any 
individual state possessed a right to disregard a treaty made by Congress, no nation 
would have entered into a treaty with us.‖); Oliver Ellsworth & William Samuel 
Johnson, Speeches in the Connecticut Convention (Jan. 4, 1788), reprinted in 15 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 243, 247 (John 
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1984) (―[T]reaties are not performed.  The 
treaty of peace with Great-Britain was a very favourable one for us.  But it did not 
happen perfectly to please some of the states: and they would not comply with it.  The 
consequence is, Britain charges us with the breach, and refuses to deliver up the forts 
on our northern quarter.‖); see also 1 RECORDS, supra note 38, at 433 (Wilson asking 
―What is the reason that Great Britain does not enter into a commercial treaty with us?  
Because [C]ongress has not the power to enforce its observance.‖). 
 42. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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a reversal of the rule that prevailed in Great Britain with respect to treaties.  
As explained by Justice Iredell in Ware v. Hylton:  
[I]t is an invariable practice in that country, when the King makes 
any stipulation [in a treaty] of a legislative nature, that it is carried 
into effect by an act of Parliament.  The Parliament is considered 
as bound, upon a principle of moral obligation, to preserve the pub-
lic faith, pledged by the treaty, by passing such laws as its obliga-
tion requires; but until such laws are passed, the system of law, en-
titled to actual obedience, remains de facto, as before.
43
 
The States‘ adherence to the British view during the period of the Articles of 
Confederation had led them to decline to enforce treaties in the absence of 
implementing legislation.  The Supremacy Clause was adopted to ―obviate 
this difficulty.‖
44
  ―Under this constitution,‖ wrote Justice Iredell:   
[S]o far as a treaty constitutionally is binding, upon principles of 
moral obligation, it is also, by the vigour of its own authority to be 
executed in fact.  It would not otherwise be the supreme law, in the 
new sense provided for, and it was so before in a moral sense. . . . 
[W]hen this constitution was ratified, the case as to the treaty in 
question stood upon the same footing, as if every act constituting 
an impediment to a creditor's recovery had been expressly re-
pealed, and any further act passed, which the public obligation had 
before required, if a repeal alone would not have been sufficient.
45
   
In other words, the Supremacy Clause ―executed‖ treaties that would other-
wise have been executory, thus dispensing with the need for implementing 
legislation.
46
   
Professor Bradley‘s claim that the Constitution permits the treaty-
makers to conclude treaties on matters beyond Congress‘ enumerated powers 
but denies such treaties the force of domestic law
47
 is flatly contradicted by 
  
 43. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 273 (1796).  Justice Iredell was sitting as Circuit Justice.  
The Supreme Court on appeal reversed his judgment on other grounds, concluding 
that Justice Iredell had not construed the treaty broadly enough.  They expressed no 
disagreement with the portions of Justice Iredell‘s analysis discussed in this text. 
 44. Id. at 276-77.   
 45. Id. at 277. 
 46. Judicial enforcement was not the sole mechanism contemplated by the Con-
stitution for achieving compliance with treaties.  For example, the Founders also gave 
Congress the power to provide for calling forth the militia to enforce treaties.  U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; see Rosenkranz, supra note 5; Vázquez, Treaty-Based 
Rights, supra note 6, at 1107 (noting that the words ―enforce treaties‖ were omitted 
from the Militia Clause as redundant). 
 47. Bradley, Federalism I, supra note 4, at 456. 
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the plain text of the Supremacy Clause, which gives domestic legal force to 
―all‖ valid treaties.  Such a flat conflict with constitutional text would suffice 
to refute a proposed constitutional interpretation were it not for the fact that it 
has come to be accepted by many that some valid treaties – those that are not 
―self-executing‖ – do not operate as laws in the absence of congressional 
implementation.  I have written that there are a number of distinct reasons 
why a treaty might require implementing legislation.
48
  For present purposes, 
the most important category of non-self-executing treaties consists of treaties 
that require legislative implementation because the parties to the treaty have 
―stipulat[ed] for [a] future legislative act.‖
49
  This category of treaties was 
introduced into U.S. law in Chief Justice Marshall‘s opinion in Foster v. Neil-
son.
50
  Like Justice Iredell in Ware v. Hylton, Marshall recognized that, in the 
absence of a Supremacy Clause, a treaty would not ―effect, of itself, the ob-
ject to be accomplished, especially so far as its operation is infra-territorial; 
but [would have to be] carried into execution by the sovereign power of the 
respective parties to the instrument.‖
51
  But, again like Justice Iredell, Mar-
shall recognized that ―[i]n the United States a different principle is estab-
lished‖ by the Supremacy Clause.
52
  ―Our constitution declares a treaty to be 
the law of the land.  It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as 
equivalent to an act of the legislature . . . .‖
53
  
Unlike Iredell, however, Marshall wrote that treaties are equivalent to 
acts of the legislature only if they ―operate[] of [themselves] without the aid 
of any legislative provision.‖
54
  Marshall‘s distinction between treaties that 
―operate of themselves‖ and those that do not is the foundation of the mod-
ern-day distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties.  
Treaties in the latter category are, in Marshall‘s words, ―address[ed] . . . to the 
political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the 
contract before it can become a rule for the Court.‖
55
   
  
 48. One category that is relatively straightforward and unproblematic consists of 
treaties that require legislative action for constitutional separation of powers reasons.  
For example, treaties that require the appropriation of money require legislation be-
cause the Constitution provides that no money shall be taken from the Treasury ex-
cept pursuant to a statute.  See Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 6, at 718-19.  A 
treaty that is non-self-executing because the Constitution assigns certain powers ex-
clusively to Congress presents no problem under Bradley‘s proposed rule because 
Congress obviously would have the power to execute the provision under Article I.  A 
second reason a treaty might require implementing legislation is because its provi-
sions are too vague for judicial enforcement.  Id. at 713-15.  This type of treaty will 
be the focus of Part IV of this Article. 
 49. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833). 
 50. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). 
 51. Id. at  314. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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As I have written elsewhere, the Court could well have decided that the 
treaty-makers lack the power to conclude treaties ―addressed to the legisla-
ture.‖
56
  The legislature, after all, makes law, and the Supremacy Clause dec-
lares treaties to be law once made.  The apparent purpose of the Supremacy 
Clause insofar as it applies to treaties was to minimize violations of treaties 
by making them judicially enforceable once made.  A power to make treaties 
subject to legislative implementation could jeopardize that goal by giving the 
House a veto over the implementation of a valid treaty.
57
  There is little evi-
dence that the Founders read the Constitution to grant the treaty-makers this 
power.
58
  Just as treaties in the United Kingdom require legislative implemen-
tation no matter what the parties intended, the Court in Foster could have 
held that, given the Supremacy Clause, treaties in the United States never 
require implementing legislation, no matter what the parties intended.  Never-
theless, it is too late in our history to reject the treaty-makers‘ power to con-
clude treaties ―addressed to the legislature.‖
59
   
Professor Bradley‘s proposal, however, would greatly magnify the prob-
lem posed by the recognition of non-self-executing treaties.  At least under 
the rule of Missouri v. Holland, if the treaty-makers conclude a treaty that 
requires implementation, the federal government has the power to implement 
it by virtue of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Compliance with non-self-
executing treaties can be secured with the assent of the House.  Under Profes-
sor Bradley‘s approach, treaties would lack domestic legal force if they ad-
dress matters outside Congress‘ legislative power, and Congress would lack 
the power to enforce such treaties pursuant to the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.  Indeed, treaties would require implementation in precisely the cir-
cumstances in which Congress would lack the power to implement them.  
Because this approach would rely on the States to enact the necessary imple-
menting legislation, it would reproduce the ―imbecili[c]‖
60
 aspect of the   
  
 56. Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 6, at 695-97. 
 57. Id. at 706. 
 58. The evidence produced by John Yoo for the proposition that the Founders 
intended that all treaties addressing matters within Congress‘ legislative powers 
would be subject to legislative implementation is very weak.  Compare John C. Yoo, 
Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Un-
derstanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999), and John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public 
Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution,  99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2218 (1999), with Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, 
Original Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2095 (1999), Vasan Kesavan, The Three Tiers of Federal Law, 100 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1479, 1488-89 (2006), Michael D. Ramsey, Toward a Rule of Law in Foreign 
Affairs, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1450, 1469-73 (2006) (reviewing JOHN YOO, THE 
POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 
(2005)), Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 892, 907-17 (2004), and Vázquez, Laughing, supra note 6. 
 59. See Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 6, at 697, 706. 
 60. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton). 
File: Vazquez Created on: 12/31/2008 10:13:00 AM Last Printed: 1/5/2009 12:23:00 PM 
2008]   MISSOURI V. HOLLAND’S SECOND HOLDING 951 
Articles of Confederation that led the Founders to scrap the Articles in favor 
of an entirely new Constitution.  The Founders would have been much more 
likely to have denied the treaty-makers the power to conclude treaties on mat-
ters beyond Article I than to allow them to conclude such treaties but rely on 
the States to implement them. 
Bradley‘s proposal also fits poorly with the rest of the Constitution, 
which grants Congress significant legislative powers in the area of foreign 
affairs.  Take, for example, the power to ―define and punish . . . Offences 
against the Law of Nations.‖
61
  This power is on its face significantly more 
intrusive of any reserved powers of the States than a power to implement 
valid treaties on matters otherwise beyond Congress‘ legislative power.  The 
Offenses Clause gives Congress the power to codify its views about what is 
required by customary international law, a type of international law that Pro-
fessor Bradley himself has claimed is less legitimate from various perspec-
tives than treaties and just as apt to address matters otherwise beyond Con-
gress‘ legislative power.
62
  And the Clause on its face authorizes the most 
intrusive form of federal law – a federal criminal statute.  If the Founders 
authorized Congress to codify and provide for the criminal enforcement of 
customary international law norms, why would they have denied Congress 
the power to implement treaty obligations that they gave the President and 
Senate the power to commit to, and that the President and Senate did in fact 
assume?   
Indeed, given the Offenses Clause, Professor Bradley‘s view that the 
Constitution denies Congress the power to implement certain valid treaty 
obligations may be not just implausible but impossible.  If the treaty-makers 
have the constitutional power to conclude the treaty, as Professor Bradley 
contemplates,
63
 then the treaty binds us on the international plane.  As a re-
sult, the United States has a duty under the law of nations law to comply with 
it.
64
  The Supreme Court has recognized that the Offenses Clause authorizes 
the federal government to ―prevent a wrong being done within its own domi-
nion to another nation with which it is at peace.‖
65
  This clearly includes the 
  
 61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 62. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as 
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 
(1997); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorpora-
tion of International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260 (1998). 
 63. Bradley, Federalism I, supra note 4, at 456. 
 64. See 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 169 (1826) (―The 
violation of a treaty of peace, or other national compact, is a violation of the law of 
nations . . . .‖); 4 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS § 221, at 347 (1792)  
(1758) (―He who violates his treaties, violates at the same time the law of nations . . . 
.‖).   
 65. United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 484 (1887). 
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violation of a valid treaty.
66
  Indeed, the narrowest reading of this clause  
advanced at the Founding was that it authorizes Congress to punish violations 
of treaties.
67
  Thus, in the face of a treaty that binds us on the international 
plane but addresses matters otherwise beyond Congress‘ legislative powers, 
Congress has the power to ―define‖ as an offense against the law of nations 
any conduct that would constitute a breach of the treaty.  If the Court‘s hold-
ing in Missouri v. Holland that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes 
implementing legislation on matter beyond Article I were to be rejected, the 
Offenses clause would provide the necessary authority.
68
   
To avoid this result, Professor Bradley would have to contend that, in 
assessing whether it has the power to enact a law under Article I, Congress 
must disregard any treaties in force on the subject (which is more or less what 
the Bricker Amendment would have required
69
).  To formulate the rule this 
way, however, is to refute it.  While a constitutional amendment could cer-
tainly accomplish the task, it is clear that a Constitution that declares treaties 
to be the ―supreme Law of the Land‖ cannot be read to require Congress, in 
exercising its other powers, to act as if a treaty that is valid and in force did 
not exist. 
  
 66. It is also clear that the clause authorizes Congress to regulate (not just crimi-
nalize) conduct of individuals (not just states) that risks placing the United States in 
violation of the law of nations.  See J. Andrew Kent, Congress’s Under-Appreciated 
Power to Define and Punish Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
843 (2007) (arguing that Offenses Clause also authorizes Congress to regulate con-
duct of U.S. States and foreign states that would violate the law of nations but recog-
nizing that the prevailing view is that the clause authorizes Congress to regulate the 
conduct of individuals). 
 67. See Anti-Cincinnatus, HAMPSHIRE (MASS.) GAZETTE, Dec. 19, 1787, re-
printed in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 487, 489-90 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978) (responding to claim by 
pamphleteer ―Cincinnatus‖ that Offenses Clause was too broad by noting that ―[a] 
violation of [treaties] is properly defined as an offence against the law of nations: and 
there is and can be no other law of nations, which binds them with respect to their 
treatment one of another, but these articles of agreement contained in their public 
treaties and alliances‖); Kent, supra note 66, at 909-10. 
 68. The Offenses Clause might, indeed, be a preferable home for the power to 
implement treaties than the Necessary and Proper Clause, as the former is a more 
plausible basis for the power to repeal a law implementing a treaty.  Bradley cites as 
an argument against the holding of Missouri v. Holland that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause cannot plausibly support a statute superseding (and thus repealing for domestic 
purposes) a treaty on matters beyond Congress‘ legislative powers.  Bradley, Federal-
ism I, supra note 4, at 457.  The Offenses Clause plausibly provides such authority, as 
the power to ―define‖ an offense against the law of nations would appear to encom-
pass the power to define the absence of an offense. 
 69. 99 CONG. REC. 6777 (1953) (―A treaty shall become effective as internal law 
in the United States only through legislation which would be valid in the absence of 
treaty.‖). 
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To be sure, Bradley is not an originalist.  He defends his approach large-
ly on non-originalist grounds.  Still, at a minimum, an approach so plainly at 
odds with the Founders‘ design is an eligible interpretation of our Constitu-
tion only if supported by truly weighty non-originalist arguments.  In Part IV, 
I argue that most of the federalism objections Bradley raises are overstated 
given the Constitution‘s structural check on the treaty-making process.  The 
only legitimate federalism problem with the holding of Missouri v. Holland 
can be adequately addressed through a modest refinement of that holding – a 
refinement that, unlike Bradley‘s approach, is entirely consistent with the 
Founders‘ design. 
III.  ROSENKRANZ‘S APPROACH 
Like Professor Bradley, Professor Rosenkranz would permit the treaty-
makers to conclude treaties addressing matters beyond Congress‘ enumerated 
powers.  Unlike Professor Bradley, he would permit the treaty-makers to 
make such treaties self-executing and thus operative as laws without the need 
for implementation by Congress.
70
  However, if the treaty-makers opt to 
make the treaty non-self-executing, Rosenkranz would deny Congress the 
power to pass laws to implement it.
71
  Rosenkranz‘s method is very different 
from Bradley‘s.  He is a textualist and, as such, relies largely on the Constitu-
tion‘s text and structure.  He also argues, however, that (happily) the conclu-
sion he reaches through textual and structural analysis is also normatively 
attractive.
72
 
In this section, I first show that Rosenkranz‘s approach, though less 
problematic than Bradley‘s from the standpoint of treaty compliance, is in-
consistent with the Founders‘ design insofar as it would leave compliance 
with some valid treaties entirely to the States.  I also show that Rosenkranz‘s 
approach is less protective of state interests than the Missouri v. Holland ap-
proach.  Finally, I show that Rosenkranz‘s textual and structural defense of 
his approach is unconvincing. 
A.  Rosenkranz’s Approach and the Founders’ Design 
In Rosenkranz‘s view, the federal government has the power to enter in-
to non-self-executing treaties addressing matters beyond Article I, but Con-
gress lacks the power to implement such treaties.
73
  Thus, by leaving       
  
 70. Rosenkranz, supra note 5, at 1919. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1935-37. 
 73. Id. at 1919-20. 
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compliance with such treaties entirely to the States, Rosenkranz, like Bradley, 
appears to reproduce the problem that the Founders tried to fix.
74
   
Rosenkranz does not directly address this problem with his thesis be-
cause he does not acknowledge that the constitutional interpretation he ad-
vances would leave the matter to the States.  He argues that his interpretation 
leaves the federal government with two ways to ensure compliance with trea-
ties addressing matters beyond Article I.  Neither argument withstands scruti-
ny. 
1.  Implementation through Constitutional Amendment. 
First, Rosenkranz argues that the federal government has the power to 
implement such treaties through a constitutional amendment.
75
  This possi-
bility cannot solve his problem.  The issue under consideration is whether our 
Constitution empowers the federal government to implement certain treaties.  
One objection to Rosenkranz‘s proposed interpretation is that it would re-
create a key problem with the Articles of Confederation that precipitated the 
Constitutional Convention and that the Founders sought to fix.  To suggest 
that this structural problem can itself be fixed through a constitutional 
amendment is not reassuring.  Any problem with a proposed interpretation can 
be fixed through a constitutional amendment, including the federalism prob-
lems that Rosenkranz believes are produced by the holding of Missouri v. 
Holland.  The fact remains that, under the Constitution we have, as Rosen-
kranz would interpret it, non-self-executing treaties addressing matters 
beyond Article I would be left for the States to implement.
76
   
Rosenkranz claims support for his position in Reid v. Covert, which held 
that treaties that agree to do what would violate the Bill of Rights are unen-
forceable.
77
  He argues that treaties that require what is prohibited by the Bill 
of Rights are valid treaties that, just like treaties that address matters beyond 
Article I, can be implemented through constitutional amendment.
78
  His anal-
ogy is inapt.  Treaties that violate the Bill of Rights are judicially              
  
 74. The problem raised by his proposal differs from the situation faced by the 
Founders in that he would recognize the power of the treaty-makers to ensure com-
pliance with treaties by making treaties self-executing.  But, for the reasons discussed 
below, this attempt to square his proposal with the Founders‘ design seems to cut 
against the states‘ interests (which are the interests protected by the enumerated pow-
ers). 
 75. See Rosenkranz, supra note 5, at 1900-01. 
 76. Additionally, it cannot be said that the constitutional amendment process is a 
power of the federal government.  Congress has the power (through a supermajority 
vote of both Houses) to propose constitutional amendments, but the amendments take 
effect only if ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states or by conven-
tions in three-fourths of the States.  U.S. CONST. art. V.   
 77. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 78. Rosenkranz, supra note 5, at 1923-25. 
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unenforceable because they are unconstitutional – meaning they are invalid as 
a matter of U.S. law.
79
  Rosenkranz disagrees, but in support of his claim that 
such treaties are valid, he relies on authorities that indicate that treaties that 
violate the U.S. Constitution may nonetheless bind the nation as a matter of 
international law.
80
  The question, however, is whether such a treaty would 
be valid as a matter of U.S. constitutional law.  International law itself recog-
nizes that a treaty that is binding under international law may not be valid as a 
matter of domestic law.  Indeed, international law recognizes that a treaty 
under certain circumstances is not binding as a matter of international law 
because it is invalid under domestic law.  Article 46 of the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties provides that a treaty is not binding under interna-
tional law if the treaty-makers ―violat[ed] . . . a provision of . . . internal law 
regarding competence to conclude treaties‖ if ―that violation was manifest 
and concerned a rule of . . . internal law of fundamental importance.‖
81
  If 
Rosenkranz‘s analysis were taken seriously, the United States would not ben-
efit from the principle reflected in article 46 because no treaty would be 
beyond the competence of the treaty-makers to conclude.  If a treaty required 
what would violate the Bill of Rights, it would be a valid treaty that merely 
requires the adoption of a constitutional amendment.  But Rosenkranz has 
offered no authority for his claim that the Constitution authorizes the treaty-
makers to make treaties that require conduct that violates the Constitution.   
As Rosenkranz recognizes, all non-self-executing treaties are problemat-
ic from a compliance perspective because compliance depends on the subse-
quent concurrence of the House.
82
  How much more problematic a treaty that 
can be complied with only through the adoption of a constitutional amend-
ment!  Rosenkranz indicates that a treaty that depends on a constitutional 
amendment for implementation is ―not qualitatively different‖ from a treaty 
that can be implemented by statute,
83
 but obtaining the concurrence of the 
House on a matter that has already received the concurrence of the President 
and two-thirds of the Senate is qualitatively different from amending the 
Constitution.  Clearly, such treaties are unconstitutional and hence invalid.
84
   
  
 79. If Reid v. Covert stands for the proposition that treaties that agree to perform 
acts that would violate the Bill of Rights are invalid, the case offers no support for 
Rosenkranz‘s interpretation.  Rosenkranz accepts Missouri v. Holland‘s first proposi-
tion and thus recognizes the validity of such treaties, insisting instead that Missouri v. 
Holland erred by recognizing that Congress has the power to implement such treaties 
through ordinary legislation.  Id. at 1876-77. 
 80. See Rosenkranz, supra note 5, at 1922-24. 
 81. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 46, ¶ 2, opened for ratifica-
tion or accession May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).  
Although the United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention, it recognizes most 
of its provisions as a codification of customary international law. 
 82. Rosenkranz, supra note 5, at 1924. 
 83. Id. at 1925. 
 84. Golove, supra note 3, at 1083. 
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2.  ―Implementation‖ through Self-Execution. 
Rosenkranz‘s second basis for insisting that his proposal does not leave 
it to the States to decide whether to comply with treaties addressing matters 
beyond Article I is more colorable.  Although he would deny Congress the 
power to implement such treaties, he recognizes that such treaties can be self-
executing.
85
  Self-executing treaties would directly displace state law and 
existing federal statutes, and they would be enforceable in the courts (federal 
and state) without prior action by Congress.  Because the treaty-makers have 
the power to make treaties self-executing, the federal government does have 
the power to ensure compliance with treaties. 
I agree that treaties going beyond Article I can be made self-executing.  
Indeed, Rosenkranz is entirely correct in noting that the Founders viewed 
self-executing treaties to be the paradigm.
86
  He is also correct to note that, 
from the standpoint of compliance, self-executing treaties are superior to non-
self-executing treaties because their enforcement does not depend on the 
House‘s consent to an implementing statute.
87
  Those would be powerful 
reasons for concluding that the Constitution requires that treaties be self-
executing, a conclusion that would find much support in the constitutional 
text and the evidence of the Founders‘ intent.
88
 
But Rosenkranz does not make such an argument.  He accepts as well-
settled the power of the President and Senate to conclude non-self-executing 
treaties.
89
  Indeed, if the Constitution were interpreted to require that treaties 
be self-executing, the issue that Rosenkranz addresses in his article would 
simply not arise.  The problem with the regime Rosenkranz defends is its 
simultaneous acceptance of the treaty-makers‘ power to conclude treaties 
requiring implementation and denial of Congress‘ power to implement them. 
This problem could be avoided by insisting that, if a treaty addresses 
matters beyond Article I, the treaty-makers must make the treaty self-
executing.  If this were the rule, Congress would have the power to imple-
ment all valid treaties requiring implementation.  But this would be a        
  
 85. Rosenkranz, supra note 5, at 1928. 
 86. Id.  (―In fact, self-executing treaties are the paradigm, and non-self-executing 
treaties—though very much in the ascendancy today—were meant to be the exception 
rather than the rule.‖). 
 87. Id. at 1928-29 (―[O]ur treaty partners will generally prefer self-executing 
treaties to non-self-executing treaties; they are equivalent international legal commit-
ments, but only the latter pose the danger that the House of Representatives will balk 
at domestic execution.‖). 
 88. See Flaherty, supra note 58; Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. 
J. INT‘L L. 760, 760-64 (1988); Ramsey, supra note 58, at 1469-70; David Sloss, Non-
Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 
7 (2002). 
 89. Rosenkranz, supra note 5, at 1889. 
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paradoxical solution to the issue posed by Missouri v. Holland.  The scope of 
Congress‘ legislative power is a federalism issue – that is, an issue concern-
ing the distribution of power as between the federal and state governments.  
Limitations on Congress‘s legislative powers serve to protect the States, 
whose laws on matters not enumerated are immune to displacement by Con-
gress.  From a federalism perspective, it seems odd to insist that, if a treaty 
addresses matters beyond Article I, the federal government may displace state 
law through a self-executing treaty, but it may not conclude a treaty that puts 
off the displacement of state law until a statute is passed by Congress to im-
plement the treaty.  The displacement of state law in one step through the 
adoption of a treaty by the President and two-thirds of the Senate that would 
be directly enforceable in the courts seems more of an impingement of the 
interests of the States than the displacement of state law through a two-step 
process that requires the consent of the same entities plus, at the second step, 
a majority of the House of Representatives – the most representative branch.
90
 
Perhaps Rosenkranz would respond that self-executing treaties are more 
difficult to negotiate than non-self-executing ones, and thus, if the choice 
were between a self-executing treaty and none at all, the result may be fewer 
treaties and hence less displacement of state law.  An argument along these 
lines is suggested by Rosenkranz‘s assertion that self-executing treaties are 
more difficult for states to conclude because they require agreement on mat-
ters of detail, whereas non-self-executing treaties can be more general.
91
  He 
indicates, for example, that a self-executing treaty would have to look some-
thing like a prolix Family Law Code.
92
  If self-executing treaties are indeed 
more difficult to negotiate, then it might be contended that state law would be 
displaced less often under his approach than under that of Missouri v. Hol-
land.  But his assumption that self-executing treaties must address matters in 
great detail is mistaken.  One could have a self-executing treaty that simply 
sets forth a general standard – such as a requirement that family law matters 
be resolved according to the best interests of the child.  State family law 
would be directly displaced by such a treaty, and state and federal courts 
  
 90. I do not mean to suggest that these federalism concerns call into question the 
legitimacy of self-executing treaties.  As discussed above, the Founders subordinated 
these federalism concerns to the nation‘s interest in treaty compliance.  My point is 
only that insisting on self-execution would be a paradoxical solution to the Missouri 
v. Holland problem, which is at bottom one of federalism.     
  I also note that my analysis here assumes that the treaty and the implement-
ing statute have a similar content, whereas Rosenkranz appears to be most troubled by 
aspirational treaty provisions which, once ratified, would serve as the basis for legis-
lation that Congress would not otherwise have power to enact.  See Rosenkranz, supra 
note 5, at 1929-32.  But Rosenkranz‘s proposed solution would apply to obligatory 
treaties as well as aspirational ones.  In Part IV, I propose a different solution for the 
federalism problem posed by aspirational non-self-executing treaties.  It is thus ap-
propriate to focus here on non-self-executing treaties that are specific and obligatory.  
 91. See id. at 1930-31. 
 92. Id. at 1930. 
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would accordingly have to enforce it without any prior action by Congress.  If 
self-executing treaties can be just as simple, and hence just as easy to nego-
tiate, as non-self-executing treaties, how do the States benefit from allowing 
the displacement of their law by means of such a treaty but not by means of a 
non-self-executing treaty followed by an implementing statute? 
Perhaps Rosenkranz‘s answer would be that the Senate is much less 
likely to agree to a self-executing treaty than a non-self-executing one.  If so, 
then perhaps state law is less likely to be displaced under a rule requiring all 
treaties addressing matters beyond Article I to be self-executing than under 
the rule of Missouri v. Holland.  Faced with the choice of adopting a self-
executing treaty or no treaty at all, the treaty-makers may well opt for no trea-
ty at all.  The idea, in other words, would be that making treaties self-
executing has become the nuclear option, unlikely to be used except in ex-
treme circumstances.  But it is far from clear that the Senate has become that 
hostile to self-executing treaties.
93
  In any event, it would be odd for a texual-
ist like Rosenkranz to defend his conclusion on this ground, as the defense is 
historically contingent.  The Founders and ratifiers of the Constitution cer-
tainly did not believe that the Senate they were creating would be hostile to 
self-executing treaties.
94
  Indeed, as Rosenkranz recognizes, the Founders 
regarded self-executing treaties as the paradigm.
95
  Furthermore, this argu-
ment alleviates the federalism objection by effectively limiting the treaty-
making power.  If the reason States should not be concerned about having 
their laws displaced through self-executing treaties is because the             
  
 93. For example, the Senate has recently given its consent to 65 treaties on the 
condition that each be accompanied by a declaration to the effect that they are self-
executing.  See S. EXEC. REP. No. 110-12, at 10 (2008); S. EXEC. REP. No. 110-13, at 
11 (2008); S. EXEC. REP. No. 110-14, at 6 (2008); S. EXEC. REP. No. 110-22, at 13 
(2008); S. EXEC. REP. No. 110-23, at 6 (2008).  The declaration would read: ―This 
Treaty is self-executing.‖  E.g., S. EXEC. REP. No. 110-12, at 10.   
 94. Indeed, if the Senate today is reluctant to make treaties self-executing, that 
may be because it knows that Congress has the power to execute them.  If Missouri v. 
Holland were overruled, the Senate may become less reluctant to enter into self-
executing treaties.  This is most likely to be the case with respect to the sort of treaty 
as to which Rosenkranz‘s proposal differs from mine – obligatory treaties that leave 
the parties with little discretion regarding what is required.  See supra text accompa-
nying note 90; infra Part IV.  In the case of specific, obligatory treaties, where the 
treaty and the implementing legislation would have essentially the same content, if the 
option of a non-self-executing treaty followed by a federal implementing statute were 
not available, it seems likely that the treaty-makers would simply make the treaty self-
executing.  In consenting to a non-self-executing treaty of a specific, obligatory cha-
racter, two-thirds of the Senate will have (a) accepted the substantive obligation and 
(b) agreed that the obligation would be fulfilled through the enactment of a statute 
having the same content as the treaty.  If the option of a non-self-executing treaty 
followed by a statute were not open, presumably the Senate that would have agreed to 
(a) and (b) would then simply agree to displace state law in one step rather than two.    
 95. Rosenkranz, supra note 5, at 1928. 
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treaty-makers will rarely, if ever, adopt them, then a rule requiring that all 
treaties addressing matters beyond Article I be self-executing would, as a 
practical matter, resemble a rule forbidding treaties addressing matters 
beyond Article I.  But Rosenkranz purports to accept that the Constitution 
permits the conclusion of treaties addressing matters beyond Article I, distin-
guishing his argument in this regard from those made by other scholars.
96
 
In any event, Rosenkranz does not argue that all treaties that address 
matters beyond Article I must be self-executing.  He is content to permit the 
treaty-makers to make non-self-executing treaties addressing matters beyond 
Article I.
97
  He would just deny Congress the power to implement them.
98
  It 
is the combination of his acceptance of treaties requiring implementation and 
his rejection of Congress‘s power to implement them that conflicts with the 
Founders‘ design.  If making treaties self-executing were indeed regarded as 
the nuclear option, responsible treaty-makers would simply not conclude 
treaties addressing matters beyond Article I (and we would effectively have a 
rule forbidding treaties beyond Article I).  By permitting the treaty-makers to 
conclude non-self-executing treaties going beyond Article I, Rosenkranz adds 
to the treaty-makers‘ menu the option of adopting a treaty that requires im-
plementation by the States.  His position amounts to the claim that the Consti-
tution permits the treaty-makers to conclude treaties that require implementa-
tion by the States.
99
  The Founders‘ contrary intent could not be plainer – they 
constitutionally federalized treaties by declaring ―all‖ of them to be the ―su-
preme Law of the Land.‖
100
  Rosenkranz‘s proposal would fly in the face of 
the lesson learned by the Founders during the critical period: that a treaty that 
depends for its compliance on the States is certain to be violated by at least 
some States, and the nation as a whole would wind up suffering the conse-
quences.
101
   
  
 96. Id. at 1937-38.   
 97. Id. at 1919. 
 98. Id. 
 99. The problem would not be severe if the treaty allowed particular States in a 
federation to opt in or opt out of its requirements.  See Agreement on Government 
Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 4(b), Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round (1994), 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gpr-94_e.pdf.  But Rosenkranz‘s proposal 
applies more broadly to treaties that require specified action.   
 100. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  Admittedly, this text also calls into question the 
very concept of a non-self-executing treaty.  As discussed in Part III.B, the fact the 
problem Rosenkranz addresses arises at all only because of the recognition of a doc-
trine that is itself hard to square with the constitutional text makes his textual metho-
dology particularly suspect. 
 101. A treaty requiring implementation by the States may also violate the anti-
commandeering doctrine.  For a discussion of  the anti-commandeering problem as 
applied to treaties, see Vázquez, Breard, Printz, supra note 7, at 1354-60.   
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B.  The Problems with Rosenkranz’s Textual and Structural Arguments 
In support of the novel and counterintuitive regime he proposes, Rosen-
kranz relies on wholly unconvincing textual and structural arguments.  His 
principal argument is textual.  He juxtaposes the text of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause with Article II‘s grant of the ―power to make treaties‖ and ar-
gues that the two together give Congress the power to enact laws that are 
necessary and proper to carry into execution the power to make treaties.
102
  
Rosenkranz insists that the power to carry into execution the power to make 
treaties is not the same as the power to execute treaties already made.
103
  The 
former power, he maintains, encompasses laws that facilitate the negotiation 
of treaties.
104
  For example, Congress could, under this clause, appropriate 
money for the negotiation of treaties and the study of problems that might be 
the subject of future treaty negotiations.
105
  But once the treaty has been 
made, the clause does not empower Congress to implement it.  The clause, in 
other words, is forward looking, giving Congress powers with respect to fu-
ture treaties but not present or past treaties. 
Among the many problems with this interpretation is that it would ap-
pear to lead equally to the conclusion that, with respect to statutes, the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause does no more than give Congress the power to appro-
priate money to hold hearings or conduct studies regarding possible subjects 
of legislation.  Rosenkranz himself draws the analogy between the Treaty 
Power and the Legislative Power: ―Textually, the phrase ‗legislative Powers‘ 
in Article I may be paraphrased as the ‗power to make laws,‘ which is parallel 
to the Article II ‗Power . . . to make Treaties.‘‖
106
  If the power to bring into 
execution the power to make treaties encompasses only the funding of nego-
tiations and other preparatory matters, then it seems to follow (although Ro-
senkranz does not acknowledge it) that the power to bring into execution the 
power to make laws regulating commerce similarly encompasses only the 
funding of hearings and other preparatory matters.  But such an understanding 
of the Necessary and Proper Clause has never been widely held. 
Moreover, even if we were to accept Rosenkranz‘s basic approach to the 
text, it would not necessarily follow that Congress lacks the power to imple-
ment treaties already made.  Rosenkranz appears prepared to accept that   
  
 102. Rosenkranz, supra note 5, at 1880-92. 
 103. Id. at 1892. 
 104. Id. at 1882. 
 105. Id.     
 106. Id. at 1886 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 202 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (―What is a LEGISLATIVE power but a power of mak-
ing LAWS?‖)).  Rosenkranz draws the parallel between the Treaty Power and the 
Legislative Power in order to set up the argument that, in the Legislative context, we 
do not allow Congress to pass statutes that are ―necessary and proper‖ to execute 
other statutes. Id.  United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), appears to be a coun-
ter-example.  
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statutes are authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause if they facilitate 
the enactment of future laws.
107
  If so, then a statute implementing an existing 
non-self-executing treaty might well pass muster on the ground that such 
implementation makes it more likely that other nations will be willing to con-
clude treaties with us in the future.  Such an interpretation would accord with 
the Founders‘ reasons for taking control over treaty compliance away from 
the States.
108
 
But there is a deeper problem with Rosenkranz‘s reliance on a close 
reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  As Rosenkranz acknowledges, 
the problem he is addressing arises only if one accepts that treaties addressing 
matters beyond Article I may be non-self-executing.  As he also recognizes, 
the Founders viewed self-executing treaties as the paradigm.  Rosenkranz 
accepts the permissibility of non-self-executing treaties not because of text or 
Founders' intent, but because such treaties have come to be accepted.
109
  If the 
question he addresses arises only because of later-developed doctrine accept-
ing that treaties beyond Article I may be non-self-executing, then closely 
scrutinizing the Constitution's text for an answer is anachronistic in the ex-
treme.  A lack of textual support for a congressional power to implement non-
self-executing treaties is equally consistent with the conclusion that the 
people who wrote the Constitution did not contemplate that treaties might be 
non-self-executing.
110
 
Furthermore, a close textual analysis of other clauses of the Constitution 
would lead to the absurd conclusion that, while Congress lacks the power to 
pass statutes to implement non-self-executing treaties that address matters 
beyond Article I, Congress can call forth the militia to enforce such treaties 
  
 107. There would appear to be no other basis for reconciling the interpretation of 
the Necessary and Proper Clause he advances in this article with the one he advanced 
in Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. 
L. REV. 2085 (2002).  In the prior article, he relied on the Necessary and Proper 
clause as the constitutional basis for the enactment of a federal statute on statutory 
interpretation. 
 
See id. at 2102.  Presumably, such a statute is forward-looking in the 
sense that it serves as an aid to subsequent Congresses, permitting them to express 
their intent more clearly in enacting laws in the future.  See id. at 2115-20 (arguing 
that general prospective interpretive statutes are constitutional). 
 108. See supra text accompanying notes 99-101. 
 109. See Rosenkranz, supra note 5, at 1928. 
 110. In the light of his willingness to accept the permissibility of non-self-
executing treaties on the ground that such treaties have long been accepted, one won-
ders why Rosenkranz refuses to accept the equally long-accepted proposition that 
Congress has the power to execute any treaty that the President-and-Senate have the 
power to make.  I accept both propositions because they are entrenched, but, if I con-
sidered myself free to reject one, I would reject the treaty-makers‘ power to render 
treaties beyond Article I non-self-executing.  If that power were rejected, however, 
the issue Rosenkranz addresses would go away entirely.  If all such treaties were self-
executing, there would be no need for Congress to implement them. 
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(in light of that clause‘s reference to ―laws‖).
111
  Indeed, a close reading of 
the text, of the sort in which Rosenkranz engages, would lead one to conclude 
that the President is under a duty to faithfully execute such treaties even 
without congressional implementation.
112
  These conclusions could be 
avoided by maintaining that non-self-executing treaties lack the force of do-
mestic law, as some scholars and courts have done.
113
  That conclusion, how-
ever, flies in the face of the text of the Supremacy Clause, which provides 
that ―all‖ treaties are the ―supreme Law of the Land.‖  To be clear, I am not 
taking a position here on whether non-self-executing treaties do or do not 
have the force of domestic law.
114
  My point is that in light of the tension 
between the concept of a non-self-executing treaty and the plain text of the 
Supremacy Clause – a tension that has led some courts and commentators to 
conclude that non-self-executing treaties lack the force of domestic law de-
spite a constitutional text declaring ―all‖ treaties to be the law of the land – it 
seems bizarre to resort to a close reading of the text of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to determine Congress‘ power to implement non-self-executing 
treaties.
115
 
Rosenkranz‘s structural arguments are equally unconvincing.  He ar-
gues, for example, that to accept the power of the President to expand Con-
gress‘ legislative power through the conclusion of a non-self-executing treaty 
would circumvent Article V by adding to the subjects of legislation enume-
rated in Article I.
116
  But one can reach that conclusion only after deciding 
that Missouri v. Holland was decided incorrectly.  If Missouri v. Holland 
correctly held that the Constitution grants Congress the power to implement 
valid non-self-executing treaties addressing matters beyond Article I, then 
recognizing that power would not circumvent Article V.  Article V therefore 
  
 111. Rosenkranz himself lays the foundation for this argument.  He concedes that 
the Founders‘ omission of the words ―to enforce treaties‖ from the Necessary and 
Proper Clause as redundant would have provided very strong evidence that the 
Founders understood that the Necessary and Proper Clause included ―the power ‗to 
enforce treaties‘ beyond the other enumerated powers.‖  See Rosenkranz, supra note 
5, at 1912-13.  If so, then the omission of those words from the Militia Clause as 
redundant shows that the Founders understood that clause to give Congress the power 
to provide for calling forth the Militia to enforce treaties beyond the other enumerated 
powers. 
 112. See U.S. Const. art VI, cl. 2 (treaties are ―Law‖); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 
(The President ―shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.‖). 
 113. The Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 
1356 (2008), could be read to endorse this view but could (and should) be read more 
narrowly.  See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land:  The Supremacy 
Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008). 
 114. For discussion of this issue, see Vázquez, supra note 113. 
 115. Even if Rosenkranz‘s argument regarding the Necessary and Proper Clause 
were accepted, moreover, Congress would retain the power to implement treaties 
under the Offenses Clause, as discussed in Part II. 
 116. See Rosenkranz, supra note 5, at 1888-1903. 
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does not help us determine whether Missouri v. Holland was correctly de-
cided. 
Rosenkranz also argues that Missouri v. Holland must be wrong because 
there is no other context in which action by the President operates to expand 
Congress‘ power to legislate.
117
  I am not sure that there are no other con-
texts,
118
 but if there are not, the more plausible conclusion is that the Treaty 
Power is sui generis in this respect.  Indeed, the Treaty Power is indisputably 
unique in other respects that do not appear to trouble Rosenkranz.  For exam-
ple, the Treaty Clause is the only provision of the Constitution that gives the 
President the power to ―make‖
119
 ―Law.‖
120
  Most relevantly, the power to 
make non-self-executing treaties (if we accept such a power, as Rosenkranz 
does) is the only example in the Constitution of a power of the President (or 
anyone) to make ―Law‖ directed to Congress.  (A non-self-executing treaty, 
as defined in the canonical case of Foster v. Nielson, is a treaty addressed to 
the legislature.)
121
  Given that the question of Congress‘ power to implement 
non-self-executing treaties arises at all only because of the existence of the 
unique power of the President to make Law directed to Congress, it is strange 
that anyone would object to the recognition of the power of Congress to im-
plement non-self-executing treaties because a similar power appears nowhere 
else in the Constitution.      
  
 117. Id. at 1897. 
 118. Consider the War Power (not discussed by Rosenkranz).  It is established 
that the existence of a war gives Congress the power to legislate on matters otherwise 
beyond Art. I.  See Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948).  Some scho-
lars argue that the President has the constitutional power to engage in war without 
congressional authorization (for example, in the event of an armed attack).  Even if all 
war must be authorized by Congress, it would remain the case that the decision to 
engage in a war that has been authorized by Congress would be the President‘s, just 
as the decision whether or not to ratify a treaty after the Senate has given its consent 
remains the President‘s.  The situations appear to be analogous. 
 119. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2 (giving the President the power to ―make‖ treaties, 
with the consent of the Senate). 
 120. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring treaties to be the ―supreme Law of the 
Land‖).  
 121. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56. 
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IV.  THE REAL FEDERALISM PROBLEM POSED BY MISSOURI V. 
HOLLAND 
Bradley and Rosenkranz both argue that their proposals are justified be-
cause of the federalism problems created by the Missouri v. Holland holding.  
They both appear to be concerned that the Treaty Power will be used to cir-
cumvent the limits on Congress‘ legislative power that the Court has recently 
begun enforcing – for example, by concluding a treaty calling for the enact-
ment of Gun Free School Zone laws of the sort struck down in United States 
v. Lopez.
122
  This problem, however, can be addressed more directly, and with 
less harm to the Founders‘ design, by treating such treaties as invalid.  Brad-
ley and Rosenkranz would allow the treaty to be made but prohibit their im-
plementation by statute.  Rosenkranz would even allow the treaty-makers 
directly to enact a Gun Free School Zone law by adopting a self-executing 
Gun Free School Zone treaty.  The latter is just as problematic if one is con-
cerned with evading Supreme Court precedent.  
Professors Henkin and Golove would address this problem by recogniz-
ing a ―bad faith‖ exception to Missouri v. Holland.
123
  Rosenkranz thinks that 
such an exception would be judicially inadministrable,
124
 and I do not disag-
ree.  My view is that the Constitution addresses this problem through a struc-
tural mechanism: the requirement that treaties receive the consent of two-
thirds of the Senate.  It is difficult to get two-thirds of the Senate to agree on 
anything.  I have trouble envisioning two-thirds of the Senate going along 
with any ―bad faith‖ attempt to evade constitutional limits on the legislative 
power through the enactment of a treaty (particularly when they have other 
resources at hand, such as the Spending Power).  In light of the two-thirds 
consent requirement, I think that the problem that concerns Bradley and Ro-
senkranz is very unlikely to arise.  In any event, this particular problem would 
be solved, without raising the structural problems I identified in Part II,
125
 by 
denying the treaty-makers the power to make such treaties. 
I do think that Missouri v. Holland raises a different federalism problem, 
however.  Today, numerous good faith treaties are in force that include aspi-
rational provisions leaving the parties with very broad discretion to determine 
how best to comply.
126
  If Congress has the power to pass statutes to imple-
ment all non-self-executing treaties, then, given the existence of these trea-
ties, Congress‘ legislative power is already effectively plenary.  Consider the 
U.N. Charter, which includes a provision calling upon member states to 
  
 122. 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see Rosenkranz, supra note 5, at 1871, 1890. 
 123. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
185, 455 (2d ed. 1996); Golove, supra note 3, at 1090 n.41.
  
 124. See Rosenkranz, supra note 5, at 1933-35. 
 125. See supra notes 37-60 and accompanying text. 
 126. See infra text accompanying note 127. 
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―promot[e] . . . human rights.‖
127
  Virtually any statute that Congress would 
like to pass in the social arena could be defended as an implementation of 
such a treaty provision. 
Bradley and Rosenkranz seem particularly concerned about treaties of 
this character.
128
  If that is their concern, however, the solutions they propose 
are overbroad.  Their concern appears to be that such treaties will easily slip 
through the advice and consent process because they do not really obligate 
the nation to do anything in particular, but once in force, they will lie around 
like a loaded gun, ready to be relied upon by a Congress eager to pass a sta-
tute it otherwise lacks the power to enact.  I agree that Missouri v. Holland, as 
applied to aspirational treaties, presents a possible problem from the perspec-
tive of federalism.  In my view, however, this problem can and should be 
addressed by refining Missouri v. Holland rather than scrapping it.  I would 
recognize that Congress has the power to enact statutes to implement a non-
self-executing treaty addressing matters beyond Article I unless the treaty is 
aspirational, as is the U.N. Charter provision mentioned above.
129
 
Restricting Congress‘ power in this way fits well with the Founders‘ 
concerns.  As noted, the Founders declared treaties to be the ―Law of the 
Land‖ in order to avoid the foreign relations problems that would be pro-
duced by treaty violations and to reap the benefits of a reputation for treaty 
compliance.
130
  If the aim is to avoid treaty violations, then the Founders‘ 
concerns are not implicated if the treaty provision is aspirational.  Aspiration-
al treaties cannot really be violated, as they commit the parties merely to at-
tempt to achieve certain ends.  Under my proposed interpretation, such trea-
ties could be implemented by Congress if they concern matters within the 
legislative power as set forth in Article I.  But, if the treaty addresses matters 
beyond Article I, implementation would be left to the States.  Implementation 
could safely be left to the States because, even if the States did nothing, there 
would be no readily identifiable treaty violation.
131
  For the same reason, 
there would be no commandeering problem. 
My proposal differs from those of Bradley and Rosenkranz in that I 
would recognize Congress‘ power to enact a statute to implement a           
  
 127. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3. 
 128. See Bradley, Federalism I, supra note 4; Bradley, Federalism II, supra note 
4; Rosenkranz, supra note 5. 
 129. Vázquez, Breard, Printz, supra note 7, at 1339 n.75; Vázquez, Eleventh 
Amendment, supra note 7, at 722-23.   
 130. See supra text accompanying notes 99-101. 
 131. My solution thus does not present the structural problem I identified at the 
outset.  The structural problem with the approaches of Bradley and Rosenkranz is that 
they would leave compliance with some valid treaties to the states.  My approach 
would deny Congress the power to pass legislation pursuant to certain valid treaties, 
but it would not leave the question of ―compliance‖ with such treaties to the states 
because aspirational treaties do not raise compliance questions in any meaningful 
sense. 
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non-self-executing treaty concerning a matter beyond Article I if the treaty 
imposes a determinate obligation.  For example, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (a non-self-executing treaty) includes a provi-
sion barring the execution of pregnant women.
132
  This provision is obligato-
ry, not aspirational.  The Constitution, properly interpreted, gives Congress 
the power to enact a statute barring the execution of pregnant women in order 
to implement our treaty obligation to refrain from such executions. 
Distinguishing aspirational from obligatory treaties will not always be 
an easy task.  I do not address that issue here beyond noting that the aspira-
tional category I have in mind consists of treaties that would not be violated 
even if nothing were done to implement them.
133
  Thus, the aspirational cate-
gory would include treaties that provide that the parties shall ―promote‖ cer-
tain ends without specifying the means.  Most relevantly, it would also in-
clude the very treaty involved in Missouri v. Holland, at least as the Court 
described it.  According to the Court, that treaty merely required the parties to 
―propose‖ specified legislation to their legislatures.
134
  A treaty that requires 
the proposal of legislation would not be violated if the proposed legislation 
were not enacted.  Thus, under the interpretation I advance here, our Consti-
tution would mandate that such legislation (if it addresses matters beyond 
Congress‘ legislative powers) be proposed to the state legislatures. 
Excluding ―aspirational‖ treaties from those that Congress may imple-
ment through legislation that would otherwise exceed constitutional limits 
would thus technically require a slight limitation of  Missouri v. Holland‘s 
holding.  But this limitation would not call into question the received under-
standing of the Court‘s holding in that case, as subsequent courts and com-
mentators have not generally relied on the precatory nature of the treaty in-
volved in that case as a basis for asserting a congressional power to imple-
ment aspirational treaties.
135
  To the extent that the test I propose does require 
  
 132. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), art. 6, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
 133. The category thus does not include all treaties that leave the states-parties 
with a measure of discretion.  For example, a treaty requiring the parties to use their 
best efforts to achieve certain ends leaves the parties with discretion, as it requires the 
parties to determine what is the best they can do, and for that reason may not be en-
forceable in the courts.  See Vázquez, supra note 113, at 660-65 (arguing that the 
Court in Medellín held the treaty before it to be non-self-executing for this reason).  
But such a treaty is not so aspirational as to be beyond Congress‘s power to imple-
ment it (if it addresses matters beyond Article I).  Whether a treaty is obligatory or 
aspirational is a matter of degree.  The category of treaty that may not be enforced by 
Congress if it falls outside Article I because it is aspirational is far narrower than the 
category of treaty that may not be directly enforced in the courts because the obliga-
tion it imposes requires the exercise of nonjudicial discretion.    
 134. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431 (1920). 
 135. Rosenkranz may be the only commentator to have pointed to this aspect of 
the Migratory Bird Treaty in determining the scope of Missouri v. Holland‘s holding, 
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a limitation of Missouri, the limitation is a small one and it is justified by the 
federalism problems created by recognition of a congressional power to im-
plement aspirational treaties going beyond Article I and the fact that the mod-
ification would be consistent with the Founders‘ design in adopting the rele-
vant constitutional provisions.  A broader revision of either of Missouri v. 
Holland‘s two holdings, however, would conflict with the Founders‘ design 
and would not be justified by any legitimate federalism interest.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Court in Missouri v. Holland held that the treaty-makers have the 
power to make treaties on matters falling outside Congress‘s legislative pow-
er under Article I and that, if they do, Congress has the power under the Ne-
cessary and Proper Clause to enact legislation to implement such treaties.  
Unlike past critics of Missouri v. Holland, Professors Bradley and Rosen-
kranz accept the first proposition but challenge the second.  The second prop-
osition has always seemed the least vulnerable.  Given their experience with 
State violations of treaties under the Articles of Confederation, it seems clear 
that the Founders would have been far more likely to deny the federal gov-
ernment the power to make treaties on matters outside of Article I than to 
allow such treaties to be made but relegate their enforcement to the States.  
The particular proposals of Professors Bradley and Rosenkranz are implausi-
ble for this and other reasons.   But Missouri v. Holland‘s second proposition 
does pose a potentially legitimate federalism problem in one particular con-
text.  Broad, aspirational treaties might easily gain the consent of two-thirds 
of the Senate because they do not seem to require very much from the nation.  
If such treaties could ground federal legislation on matters falling outside 
Article I, then Congress‘s legislative power could (and may already have) 
become effectively plenary.   This problem does not require a complete re-
thinking of Missouri v. Holland‘s second holding.   The problem can and 
should be addressed by regarding Missouri v. Holland‘s second holding as  
applicable to obligatory but not aspirational treaties.   Under this approach, 
the former treaties may be implemented by Congress even if they concern 
matters beyond Congress‘s legislative power under Article I, but the latter 
treaties may be implemented by Congress only if they concern matters within 
the Article I legislative power. 
  
and he does so in order to discredit the decision.  See Rosenkranz, supra note 5, at 
1930 n.285. 
